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THE MASS GRAVES AT DASHT-E LEILI: ASSESSING U.S.
LIABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING THE
WAR IN AFGHANISTAN
I. INTRODUCTION
International law recognizes that commanders and states may be held li-
able for acts of omission.' The fact that a commander or a state did not actu-
ally commit a given violation of international law does not always mean that
the commander or state is wholly free of liability. That is, if a commander
knew that violations were occurring and had the power to stop them, the
commander could be held liable for failing to prevent the violations from oc-
curring. Similarly, there are instances in which a state could be held respon-
sible for its failure to act.
In November 2001, a group of investigators from Physicians for Human
Rights found mass graves in Dasht-e Leili, Afghanistan.2 Evidence indicates
that these were the graves of hundreds, if not thousands, of men, and
while not proven conclusively, that the United States may have had the op-
portunity to save these men's lives, but chose not to do so. 3 This comment
discusses U.S. liability under international human rights law for acts of
omission. Part I provides the historical background of human rights viola-
tions surrounding the mass graves that were found in Afghanistan in No-
vember 2001. Part H focuses on command responsibility, analyzing when
commanders may be held liable for acts of omission under international law
and how this issue has been examined by international courts and tribunals.
Part I does the same in regard to state liability. Finally, Part IV applies
these concepts to the United States, and assesses whether the United States
could be held liable under international law for failing to prevent the deaths
in Afghanistan.
1. See, e.g., 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELLi Ac PACIS LIBRI TRES, at xiv (James Brown
Scott ed. & Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oceana Publications 1964).
2. Babak Dehghanpisheh et al., The Death Convoy of Afghanistan, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 26,
2002, at 29.
3. See id. at 23.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Afghani execution chambers measured 8 feet by 8 feet by 40 feet.4
In 1997, members of the Taliban died in them.5 In 1998, it was their ene-
mies' turn.6 In November 2001, it was the Taliban's turn to die in these
chambers once again.7 The execution chambers had originally been used as
foreign aid containers, that is, they were used by foreign countries to send
care packages and humanitarian supplies to Afghanistan.' However, in 1997,
Uzbek general, Malik Pahlawan, found a more sinister, equally efficient, use
for them.9 When he first used the containers in 1997, all of the 1,250 prison-
ers he stuffed into them were charred to a crisp.10 "Death by container" is the
way that some refer to this form of mass murder.1
Unlike the prisoners who were killed in 1997, the prisoners who were
crammed into the containers in November 2001-up to 300 people in
each 2 -were not "grilled black."' 3 Although it was warm, the November
temperatures in Afghanistan did not lead to such death by intense heat;14 in-
stead, the prisoners were slowly strangled to death from the lack of oxygen
in the cramped containers. 5 According to Bill Haglund, an investigator for
Physicians for Human Rights who discovered the freshly bulldozed mass
graves of the suffocated prisoners, "[t]he victims were all young men, and
their bodies showed 'no overt trauma'-no gunshot wounds, no blows from
blunt instruments... [which is] 'consistent' with the survivors' stories of
death by asphyxiation."' 6 The prisoners who actually survived the transports
suffered immensely during the trip. Some chewed each other's skin to
quench their thirst.'" Others were lucky enough to be given air and water by
truck drivers who were conscripted to transport the containers from Konduz
to the prison at Sherberghan near Dasht-e Leili.18 The drivers gave the pris-
4. Id. at 27.
5. In 1997, Uzbek general, Malik Pahlawan, decided to turn international aid containers
into infernos. See id.
6. Id.
7. Claus Christian Malzahn, Afghanistan: Die Todeswiiste des Generals, Spiegel Online,
Aug. 05, 2002, at http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel.
8. Id.
9. Dehghanpisheh et al., supra note 2, at 27.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Marianne Wellershoff, "Das Massaker von Afghanistan" Tote kann man nicht au-
frechnen, Spiegel Online, Dec. 19, 2002, at http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft.
13. Dehghanpisheh et al., supra note 2, at 27.
14. Malzahn, supra note 7.
15. Id.
16. Dehghanpisheh et al., supra note 2, at 22-23.
17. Ingo Stawitz, Kriegsverbrechen unter US-Schutz, BUndis Rechts, Aug. 23, 2002, at
http://www.wno.org/newspages/pol55.html.
18. Id.
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oners air by drilling holes into the containers. 9 Drilling holes into the sides
of the containers was not just a showing of humanitarian concern, it was an
act of bravery. Disobeying orders to ignore the prisoners' pleas or creating
air holes for them could result in dire consequences. For example, at least
one truck driver was publicly beaten with rifle butts by five men for disobey-
ing such orders.2'
It may never be known exactly how many men died during their con-
finement in the containers. Some refuse to speculate on the death toll.2'
Those who do speculate give a wide range of estimates. For example, Iren
Jamie Doran, a documentary filmmaker who made a film that was aired on
the German news channel, ARD, estimated that over 3,000 people died.22
His estimate included those who actually died in the containers, and those
wounded and unconscious men who were allegedly shot by Northern Alli-
ance soldiers upon reaching Sherberghan.23 In a confidential U.N. memoran-
dum, a witness estimated that 960 people died. 24 The director of the Afghan
Organization of Human Rights, Aziz ur Rahman Razekh, is confident that
over 1,000 people were killed in the containers. 25 Similarly, a report pre-
pared by Physicians for Human Rights noted that there may be more than
2,000 victims, but said the organization was unable to verify the death toll
without exhuming the bodies from the mass graves.26 Even the perpetrators
of the tragedy acknowledge that men died during the transports. Northern
Alliance General Abdul Rashid Dostum was in charge of monitoring the sur-
render of the Taliban troops and their subsequent transfer to Mazar-e
Sharif.2 His spokesperson, Faizullah Zaki, admitted that 100-120 people
died in the containers, 29 although Zaki added that, "[the prisoners] suffo-
cated. Died, not killed. Nobody killed anybody."30
Even if it is true that nobody intentionally killed anyone, is this really a
satisfactory conclusion to the whole story? Or, should there be an investiga-
tion to determine whether someone was in the position to prevent these
deaths from happening in the first place? If so, would that person be obliged
under international law to try to prevent the deaths? What if the party re-
sponsible was the United States military? In such a case, could the United
19. Id.
20. Dehghanpisheh et al., supra note 2, at 27.
21. See id. at 23.
22. Wellershoff, supra note 12.
23. Id.
24. Dehghanpisheh et al., supra note 2, at 24.
25. Id.
26. Physicians for Human Rights, Preliminary Assessment of Alleged Mass Gravesites in
the Area of Mazar-I-Sharif Afghanistan: January 16-21 and February 7-14, available at
http://www.phrusa'org/research/afghanistan/report-"graves.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2003).
27. See Dehghanpisheh et al., supra note 2, at 25.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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States be deemed responsible for these "deaths by container"?3 If it could be
ascertained that the U.S., or a U.S. military commander, knew about the con-
tainers and the hazards they posed, would the military commander or the
U.S. be liable for the deaths in Afghanistan?
According to articles published by "Newsweek," the German magazines
"Spiegel" and "Biindis Rechts," the United States military was in the area at
the time the deaths occurred. 32 Although no evidence suggests that American
forces had advance notice of the deaths, or that they witnessed the containers
being loaded or unloaded, it is doubtful that they were totally unaware of the
container transports and the high mortality rate associated with them.33 De-
spite protests by U.S. officials that the U.S. knew nothing about the atroci-
ties, some believe that U.S. service members witnessed the deaths.3' To sup-
port this contention, some cite the fact that the 595 A-team from the Fifth
Special Forces Group based at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, led by Captain
Mark D. Nutsch, was "the crucial link between the Northern Alliance militia
on the ground and U.S. firepower in the air."35 The 595 A-team was also the
unit that was assigned to work with General Dostum.36 In fact, the team was
with General Dostum during the surrender negotiations of the men who later
died in the containers.37 Members of the team were also present during the
surrender of the men at Konduz," and were in the vicinity of the Sher-
berghan prison when the containers started to arrive.39 It is possible that
members of the A-team even knew that large numbers of people died during
the transport.' If these reports and allegations could be substantiated, could
the U.S. be held liable under international human rights law for acts of omis-
sion during the Afghanistan conflict? Could Captain Mark D. Nutsch, the
leader of the 595 A-team from the Fifth Special Forces Group, be held re-
sponsible for acts of omission during the war?
I1. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
International law recognizes that acts of omission may be punishable of-
fenses. Specifically, the doctrine of command responsibility demonstrates
31. Dehghanpisheh et al., supra note 2.
32. Id.; Malzahn, supra note 7; Ingo Stawitz, supra note 17.
33. Pentagon speaker, Dave Lapan, said that the Pentagon position is that there is no evi-
dence that the troops participated in the killings, knew of the killings, or were present during
the killings. Susanne Koelbl, Kriegsverbrechen: Tod im Container, Spiegel Online, Dec. 16,
2002, at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland.
34. Nicole Janz, Europa-Parlament startet Untersuchung, Spiegel Online, June 25, 2002,
at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland.
35. Dehghanpisheh et al., supra note 2.
36. Stawitz, supra note 17.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Dehghanpisheh et al., supra note 2.
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that a commanding officer can be held liable for the acts of another or, alter-
natively, for failing to prevent another from committing an illegal act.4'
Therefore, under the doctrine of command responsibility, a military com-
mander may be held liable for the actions of those under his control.
A. Liability for Acts of Omission Under International Law
International law has long recognized that acts of omission are punish-
able offenses. For example, Hugo Grotius wrote one of the first treatises on
international law in the early seventeenth century, 42 and in his treatise,
Grotius questioned when punishments could be "shared. 43 He found that
one need not personally inflict the damage to be at fault for a given wrong."
Therefore, those who order a wicked act, or who grant to it the necessary
consent, or who aid it, or who furnish asylum, or those who in any other
way share in the crime itself; those who give advise, who praise or ap-
prove; those who do not forbid such an act although bound by law prop-
erly so called to forbid it, or those who do not bring aid to the injured al-
though bound to do so by the same law; those who do not dissuade when
they ought to dissuade; those who conceal the fact which they are bound
by some law to make known-all these may be punished, if there is in
them evil intent sufficiently to deserve punishment. 
5
He later noted that those who have control over others commit a crime if
they either tolerate the crimes of those under their control or give refuge to
the perpetrators of such crimes.4" This liability only attaches, however, when
the person in control could have prevented such crimes from being commit-
ted.47
The 1907 Hague Conventions also contain Articles that define the re-
sponsibility of commanding officers for the acts of those under their control.
For example, Article 3 of the Hague Convention (IV), Convention Respect-
ing the Laws and Customs of War on Land, reads: "A belligerent party
which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case de-
mands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts
committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.""
41. As discussed below, such liability has also been extended to civilians who exercise
command and control over others.
42. GROTIUS, supra note 1, at xiv.
43. Id. at 522.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 522-23.
46. Id. at 523.
47. Id. at 524.
48. James Brown Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, I THE
CONFERENCE OF 1907 621 (2000) (translation of the official texts) (prepared in the Division of
International Law of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
2003]
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Following World War I, a Preliminary Peace Conference was held on
January 25, 1919.4" The Commission was formed to determine, among other
things, who should be responsible for the war, which laws of war had been
breached by the German government, and whether German leaders could be
held responsible for war offenses.5° Regarding command responsibility for
acts of omission, the American delegation asserted that an individual could
be held responsible if that person had knowledge about the commission of
the crime, and the authority to stop the crime from being committed.5 They
added that "[n]either knowledge of commission nor ability to prevent is
alone sufficient. The duty or obligation to act is essential. They must exist in
conjunction, and a standard of liability which does not include them all is re-
jected." 2 Thus, liability for acts of omission attaches when a commander
knows that people under his control are committing crimes and has the au-
thority to stop them.
Several decades passed before command responsibility began to be rec-
ognized again under international law. Under Geneva Protocol I of 1977, it
was determined that a commander could be held responsible for violations of
international law perpetuated by his or her subordinates.5 3 This liability ap-
plies only if the commander knew, or should have known that the crime
would be committed and did nothing to prevent the crime from being com-
mitted.5 4 In addition, Protocol I says that commanders have a duty to prevent
their subordinates from breaching international law.55
The 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court also em-
braces the doctrine of command responsibility. 6 Per the Rome Statute, a
49. Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties, 14 AM. J INT'LL. 95 (1920).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 143.
52. Id.
53. Specifically, Article 86(2) of Geneva Protocol I of 1977 reads: "The fact that a
breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not ab-
solve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew,
or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the
time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take
all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach." Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Article 86(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force
Dec. 7, 1978).
54. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 86(2), T.I.A.S.
No. 17512 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol I].
55. Id. art. 87(1) ("'he High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall re-
quire military commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under their com-
mand and other persons under their control, to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and
to report to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol.").
56. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (July 17, 1998), UN Doc. No.
A/CONF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M 999, 1017 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Stat-
ute].
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military or civilian commander can be held liable in the International Crimi-
nal Court for the criminal acts of his or her subordinates if the commander
knew the act would be committed and did not take reasonable steps to pre-
vent the crime from being committed.57
The Rome Statute is the most recent codification of command responsi-
bility under international law. The Rome Statute has both mens rea and ac-
tus reus requirements. Regarding the mens rea requirement, a military com-
mander must have had actual or presumed knowledge of the crimes of his or
her subordinates in order to be held liable58 and civilian commanders are
held liable when they "consciously disregard[] information which clearly in-
dicate[s] ... the subordinates were committing or about to commit such
crimes."59 Under both standards, the mens rea element is measured at the
time the subordinate commits the crime." The actus reus requirement is the
same for military and civilian commanders. It is satisfied if five criteria are
met: (1) the commander must be a military or civilian superior;6 (2) he or
she must have effective command and control over his or her subordinates;62
57. Id. Specifically, Article 28 of the Rome Statute reads:
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court:
1. A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander
shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective
authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exer-
cise control properly over such forces, where:
(a) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circum-
stances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about
to commit such crimes; and
(b) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reason-
able measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
2. With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in para-
graph 1, a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdic-
tion of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority
and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such
subordinates, where:
(a) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which
clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such
crimes;
(b) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility
and control of the superior; and
(c) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his
or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
Id.
58. 1 TiE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY
849 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter COMMENTARY].
59. Rome Statute, supra note 56, at art. 28.
60. COMMENTARY, supra note 58, at 549.
61. Id.
62. Id.
2003]
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(3) there must be a causal relation between the commission of crimes by the
subordinate and the failure to exercise authority on the part of the com-
mander;63 (4) the commander must fail to "take the 'necessary and reason-
able measures within his or her power' to prevent the crimes from being
comniitted; 6 and (5) after the crimes have been committed, the commander
must fail to prosecute his or her subordinates in the appropriate forum.65 If
all five of these criteria have been met, and the commander has met the mens
rea requirements of Article 28, the commander can be held liable for the
crimes of his or her subordinates. 66
As this historical overview demonstrates, the doctrine of command re-
sponsibility has long been recognized under international law. The doctrine
has been recognized in both custom and statute, giving unquestionable
precedent to support the conclusion that U.S. Commander Nutsch should be
held responsible for the deaths by container if he knew that crimes were be-
ing committed, had the power to stop them, but failed to do so.
B. Concepts as Examined by International Courts and Tribunals
In addition to analyzing the statutes pertaining to command responsibil-
ity, it is necessary to examine how international courts and tribunals have
addressed the statutes in cases brought before them. Tribunals such as the
Tokyo and Nuremberg tribunals following World War II, and the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have heard
various cases regarding command responsibility. 67 The decisions rendered in
these tribunals and courts demonstrate how the statutes and rules of com-
mand responsibility are implemented in practice.
1. Tribunals for Japan
One of the most notorious cases following World War II was the case of
the Commanding General of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippine
63. Id. at 850.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 849-50.
67. See, e.g., U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, case no. 21, 4 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS 1 (1948); U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, case no. 72, 12 LAW REPORTS OF
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1 (1948) (Summary: The German High Command Trial: Trial of
Wilhelm von Leeb and Thirteen Others) [hereinafter Wilhelm von Leeb]; Prosecutor v. Dela-
lic, ICTY Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (1998), reprinted in 3 ANNOTATED
LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1997-1999 363 (Andrd Klip & Gdran Sluiter eds.,
2001); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No.: ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (1999),
reprinted in 2 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 1994-1999 555 (Andr6 Klip & Goran
Sluiter eds., 2001).
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Islands, General Tomoyuki Yamashita.68 General Yamashita was first prose-
cuted before the United States Military Commission in Manila.69 The com-
mission noted that the troops under Yamashita's command committed wide-
spread atrocities, such as withholding medical attention and food from
prisoners of war, pillaging, burning and destroying homes and buildings, and
torturing, raping, and murdering civilians." General Yamashita did not deny
these allegations,7 although he did deny ordering his troops to commit such
atrocities" or having the "power to discipline, promote, demote or remove
members of the naval land forces." 3 He did admit, however, that he was re-
sponsible for commanding the prisoner-of-war and civilian internment
camps, and that his approval was required before any death sentences could
be carried out in them.74 He also admitted that he never inspected the
camps.75 Ultimately, the commission concluded that:
[i]t is absurd.., to consider a commander a murderer or rapist because
one of his soldiers commits a murder or a rape. Nevertheless, where mur-
der and rape and vicious, revengeful actions are widespread offences, and
there is no effective attempt by a commander to discover and control the
criminal acts, such a commander may be held responsible, even criminally
liable, for the lawless acts of his troops, depending upon their nature and
the circumstances surrounding them .... [The Commission then ad-
dressed General Yamashita by saying:] a series of atrocities and other high
crimes have been committed by members of the Japanese armed forces
under your command... [and] during the [time] in question you failed to
provide effective control of your troops as was required by the circum-
stances. Accordingly .... the Commission finds you guilty as charged and
sentences you to death by hanging.76
General Yamashita subsequently challenged the decision of the military
commission to the Supreme Court of the United States, but the Supreme
Court confirmed the decision of the military commission.7 7 Consequently,
General Yamashita was held liable for failing to prevent his troops from vio-
68. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); see also U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, CASE NO.
21, 4 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1 (1948) (Summary: Trial of General To-
moyuki Yamashita) [hereinafter Yamashita Summary].
69. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 3.
70. Id. at 18.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 22.
73. ld. at 21.
74. Id. at 23.
75. Id. at 22.
76. Id. at 35.
77. General Yamashita made several challenges to his conviction before the military
commission. Namely, he challenged: (1) the lawfulness of the military commission; (2) that
the charges against him were not charges recognized within the laws of war; (3) the jurisdic-
tion and authority of the commission; and (4) the lack of notice. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at
6.
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lating international humanitarian laws under the doctrine of command re-
sponsibility.78
2. Tribunals for Germany
German commanders were also held responsible for the actions of their
troops. For example, the United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg ad-
dressed the issue of command responsibility in the trial of Wilhelm von Leeb
and thirteen other high-ranking officers of the German Navy and Army.79
The tribunal noted that "[c]riminality does not attach to every individual in
this chain of command from that fact alone. There must be a personal dere-
liction [of duty]."8 The tribunal continued by noting that a commander may
be in dereliction of duty when the commander fails to "properly supervise
his subordinates. .. amounting to a wanton, immoral disregard of the action
of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence."'" The tribunal concluded
that a military commander may be held responsible for the acts of his subor-
dinates if he knew the offenses were being committed yet failed to inter-
vene.
82
Another case regarding the doctrine of command responsibility during
the tribunals for Germany concerned a series of events in which subordinates
murdered prisoners of war.83 The court discussed three separate groups of
murders committed by troops under Major Karl Rauer's and his fellow offi-
cers' control, and analyzed them together to determine what the commanders
knew, or should have known, based on the totality of the circumstances of all
three groups of murders." The evidence presented at the tribunal showed
that after the first incident, a report was issued stating that the prisoners of
war were shot while trying to escape. 5 A similar report was issued after the
second incident, which occurred close in time to the other shootings.86 The
court found that although the commanders may not have ordered the murders
of the prisoners of war, they were responsible for the deaths in the second
and third incidents.87 The reason for this decision was that "it was less rea-
sonable for these officers to believe after the second incident that the prison-
ers involved were shot while trying to escape than it was after the first, and
that measures should have been taken after the first shootings to prevent a
78. See id. at 25.
79. Wilhelm von Leeb, supra note 67.
80. Id. at 76.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 77.
83. U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, CASE NO. 23, 4 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 113 (1948) (Summary: Trial of Major Karl Rauer and Six Others) [hereinafter
Major Karl Rauer].
84. Id.
85. Id. at 113-14.
86. Id. at 114,116.
87. Id. at 115.
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repetition."8 8 That is, after hearing that prisoners were shot while trying to
escape once, Major Rauer and his fellow officers should have investigated
subsequent similar reports because they were more likely to arouse suspicion
in a reasonable person than one isolated report.
A cursory overview of cases involving command responsibility during
the trials for German war criminals reveals that commanding officers were
held responsible for the acts of their subordinates.8 9 They were held respon-
sible for failing to intervene when they knew that violations of international
law were occurring, as well as for tolerating such violations.' The tribunals
also noted that disregarding the atrocities committed by a commanding offi-
cer's subordinates amounted to acquiescence, and that an officer could be
held responsible for failing to prevent those atrocities from occurring.9" Fi-
nally, the tribunals noted that a standard of reasonableness needed to be used
to determine whether a commanding officer knew his or her subordinates
were violating international law.92
3. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
The first post-World War II tribunal to be created was the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).9 3 The ICTY was cre-
ated in 1993 and, as with its predecessors, the ICTY recognized the doctrine
of command responsibility. 94
One example of the ICTY's recognition of the doctrine of command re-
sponsibility was in the Celebici case, or Prosecutor v. Delali.95 The Cele-
bici case arose out of a series of events, in the middle of 1992, when a group
of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnians Croats took over a Serbian village known
as Celebici, and turned it into a prison camp.96 Prisoners in the camp were
88. Id. at 117.
89. See also U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, CASE NO. 47, 8 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS 34 (1948) (The Hostages Trial: Trial of Wilhelm List and Others).
90. See Major Karl Rauer, supra note 83, at 113.
91. See Wilhelm von Leeb, supra note 67, at 76.
92. See Major Karl Rauer, supra note 83, at 113.
93. Michael P. Scharf, The ICTY at Ten: A Critical Assessment of the Major Rulings of
the International Criminal Tribunal Over the Past Decade, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 865, 865
(2003).
94. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic, ICTY Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgment
(1998), reprinted in 3 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS:
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1997-1999 363
(Andr6 Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2001); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, ICTY Case No. IT-95-
14/l-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (1999), reprinted in 4 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1999-2000 279 (Andr6 Klip & Gsran Sluiter eds., 2002).
95. Prosecutor v. Delalic, ICTY Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (1998),
reprinted in 3 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1997-1999, 363 (Andr6
Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2001).
96. Id. at 405.
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"killed, tortured, sexually assaulted, beaten, and otherwise subjected to cruel
and inhuman treatment." 97 Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic, and
Esad Landzo were charged with 49 counts of violations of international law,
including charges of rape, murder, torture, and causing serious injury to oth-
ers.98 Ultimately, only Zdravko Mucic was found guilty on counts involving
command responsibility. 99
During the case, Mucic and his co-defendants raised several defenses.
One defense was that they were civilians, and thus could not be held liable
under the doctrine of command responsibility."° The court reviewed the
case history of the German and Japanese war crimes tribunals and concluded
that "the applicability of the principle of superior responsibility in Article
7(3) [of the Statute of the ICTY] extends not only to military commanders
but also to individuals in non-military positions of superior authority."''
Another defense they raised was that they did not have any formal authority
to command. 0 2 The court reviewed the case history again, and found that the
doctrine of superior responsibility extends to civilian superiors only to the
extent that they exercise a degree of control over their subordinates which is
similar to that of military commanders. 103
In the end, Mucic was found guilty under the doctrine of command re-
sponsibility regarding acts of murder, torture, causing great suffering or seri-
ous injury, and inhumane acts committed by his subordinates."° The tribunal
found Mucic guilty under the doctrine of command responsibility, because
he was the commander of the prison camp for approximately six months,'0 5
yet he failed to act to prevent the abuses, even though he "was fully aware of
the fact that the guards at the Celebici prison-camp were engaged in viola-
tions of international humanitarian law."' 016 Although Mucic received other
separate sentences for crimes he personally committed, the tribunal sen-
tenced him to a combined total of 56 years imprisonment for the crimes he
was liable for under the doctrine of command responsibility. 7
As the Celebici case demonstrates, the ICTY recognizes the doctrine of
command responsibility.08 The accused, in such cases, does not need to be a
97. Id. at 653.
98. id. at 653-61.
99. Id. at 640-41.
100. See id. at 453.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 456.
103. Id. at 457.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 371-72.
106. Id. at 541.
107. See id. at 640-41.
108. See also Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment (1999), reprinted in 4 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1999-
2000 279 (Andrd Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2002).
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military commander. Rather, a civilian exercising similar command respon-
sibility may also be held liable under the doctrine. 09 In order to be held re-
sponsible, however, the person only needs to have authority, though not nec-
essarily formal authority, over the people who are committing the crimes,
such that the commander can give them orders and discipline them for in-
subordination." 0 In addition, in order to be culpable, the commander must
know, or should know, that the crimes are being committed but do nothing
to stop them."'
4. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
The second post-World War II tribunal that recognized the doctrine of
command responsibility was the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR)." 2 The ICTR addressed the doctrine of command responsibility in
Prosecutor v. Kayishema. 13 There, the tribunal analyzed, among other
things, whether Clement Kayishema, as Prefect of the Kibuye Prefecture,
could be held responsible for the actions of his subordinates. The prosecu-
tion alleged that Clement Kayishema ordered people to massacre Tutsis who
had taken refuge in a Catholic church, a complex building, and a stadium lo-
cated in the Kibuye Prefecture using guns, grenades, machetes, spears, cudg-
els, and other weapons. 14 He was also charged for the deaths of thousands
of men, women, and children within the area of Bisesero." 5 The tribunal
noted that even if Kayishema was not found individually responsible for his
own actions, he could still face liability for the actions of his subordinates." 6
Thus, a person would not escape command responsibility for the actions of
his or her subordinates merely because the commander acted in concert with
his or her subordinates.
In this case, the tribunal noted that the prosecution would have to show
three things in order to hold Kayishema liable under the doctrine of com-
mand responsibility: (1) that Kayishema was a commander; (2) that he had
control over the particular person committing the crime; and (3) that he
knew enough about the actions of his subordinates to make him liable under
109. See id. at 453.
110. Seeid. at 457.
111. See id. at 541.
112. Michael P. Scharf, The ICTY at Ten: A Critical Assessment of the Major Rulings of
the International Criminal Tribunal Over the Past Decade, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 865, 865
(2003).
113. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No.: ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (1999),
reprinted in 2 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 1994-1999 555 (Andrd Klip & Goran
Sluiter eds., 2001).
114. Id. at 560-61.
115. Id. at 563.
116. Id. at598.
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the doctrine of command responsibility. 1 7 Ultimately, the tribunal found that
the prosecution had met its burden of proof and found that Kayishema was
liable under the doctrine of command responsibility for genocide in the mas-
sacres at the church, building complex, stadium, and in the area of Bise-
sero.118 Thus, the ICTR also recognizes the doctrine of command
responsibility. "9
As these cases show, international tribunals have held commanders li-
able for actions of their subordinates time and time again. They have been
held liable under the doctrine of command responsibility for failing to super-
vise their subordinates and for failing to conduct adequate investigations into
questionable circumstances. They have also been held liable when they work
in concert with their subordinates or even in some instances where they have
no formal authority over their subordinates. The case at hand could be
analogized to many of the cases discussed above. As such, it is possible that
Captain Nutsch would have been held liable too for the "deaths by con-
tainer," if the facts surrounding his case would have been tried by the inter-
national tribunals discussed above.
IV. STATE RESPONSIBILITY
As with commanders, international law recognizes that states may also
be liable for acts of omission. Under the doctrine of state responsibility, a
country is held liable for violations of international law that the country, or
those countries under its control has committed, as well as for failing to pre-
vent violations of international law from occurring when certain elements of
control and knowledge are present.
A. Liability for Acts of Omission Under International Law
The law of state responsibility recognizes that acts of omission may lead
to responsibility by the non-acting State party. The first time this doctrine
was addressed in international law was when a Preparatory Committee met
to draft rules on state responsibility in 1930.12' In the late 1940s, the topic
was addressed again when the General Assembly of the United Nations
formed the International Law Commission.' Although the commission did
not place too much emphasis on developing the rules of state responsibility,
117. See id. at 598-99.
118. Id. at 663.
119. See also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No.: ICTR-96-4-T, reprinted in 2
ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 1994-1999, 399-554 (Andr6 Klip & Goran Sluiter, eds.,
2001).
120. SHABTAi ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S DRAFT ARTICLES ON
STATE RESPONSIBILTY 4 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1991).
121. International Law Commission, annex to General Assembly Resolution 174 (II) of
November 21, 1947.
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it was during this period that the commission began to realize how important
it was to codify such rules. 122
Since the early 1960s, the law of state responsibility has developed
dramatically. In the late 1960s, the International Law Commission discussed
how the laws of state responsibility had been developed by private bodies,
regional bodies, and under the League of Nations. 123 Then they planned for
the codification of the laws of state responsibility under the United Na-
tions,"2 noting that the objective element leading to liability under the rules
of state responsibility included an "act or omission objectively conflicting
with an international legal obligation of the State."'1 25 They also noted that a
state violates an international legal obligation when it violates "a rule of in-
ternational law whatever its origin and in whatever sphere.'
' 26
In 1970, the International Law Commission said that, "an internationally
wrongful act exists where [c]onduct consisting of an action or omission is
imputed to a State under international law[,] and [where] [s]uch conduct, in
itself or as a direct or indirect cause of an external event, constitutes a failure
to carry out an international obligation of the State.' 27 When the Interna-
tional Law Commission described why it included acts of omission in its
definition, the commission noted that the concept of states being responsible
for acts of omission "is not disputed, [and thus] there is no need to dwell on
it further, except perhaps to stress that it seems particularly advisable to state
expressly, in the statement of the conditions for the existence of an interna-
tionally wrongful act, that internationally wrongful conduct imputed to a
State can equally well be an omission as an action. ' 128
In subsequent years, the International Law Commission defined state re-
sponsibility for acts of individuals, groups of individuals acting in their pri-
vate capacity, 29 and for those acting as part of an insurrectional move-
ment. '3 They also discussed cases in which a state would be liable for
122. ROSENNE, supra note 120, at 22-23.
123. Roberto Ago, First Report on State Responsibility, [1969] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
125, 127-32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/217.
124. Id. at 132-41.
125. Id. at 139.
126. Id.
127. State Responsibility, [197012 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 195, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233.
128. Id. at 188.
129. In the fourth report, the Commission said that acts of individuals are not acts of
State, but this rule "is without prejudice to the attribution to the State of any omission on the
part of its organs, where the latter ought to have acted to prevent or punish the conduct of the
individual or group of individuals and failed to do so." Roberto Ago, Fourth Report on State
Responsibility, [1972] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 71, 126, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/264.
130. The Commission noted in their fourth report that a state could be liable for the acts
of "a person or group of persons acting in the territory of a State as organs of another State or
of an international organization" when they fail to prevent "a person or group of persons act-
ing in the territory of a State as organs of an insurrectional movement directed against that
State and possessing separate international personality" from committing violations of inter-
national law. Id. at 143.
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failing to prevent a breach of international law from occurring.131 Signifi-
cantly, the International Law Commission also proposed an article assessing
liability to a state for aiding another state to commit an internationally
wrongful act.132 In this regard, the International Law Commission noted that
a state could be held liable for the international wrongful acts of another
state if they controlled the other state, or coerced the other state to commit
the unlawful acts. 133
Finally, in 1980, the Draft Articles on State Responsibility were pro-
duced by the International Law Commission.' 34 These articles are replete
with examples of states being held responsible for failing to prevent their
own violations of international law and failing to prevent violations of inter-
national law committed by other states. 35 Sixteen years later, in 1996, the
International Law Commission published another Draft Articles on State Re-
sponsibility, and in 1997 the Commission dedicated itself to completing a
second reading of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility by 2001.136 The
purpose of this second reading was to clarify some of the issues that re-
mained unresolved following the publication of the first draft.137 Finally, in
November 2001, the International Law Commission published the Articles
on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 38 Thus,
after nearly sixty years, a set of rules codifying the laws of state responsibil-
ity has been completed.
131. In the seventh report on state responsibility, the International Law Commission dis-
cussed liability for failing to prevent an event from occurring. Roberto Ago, Seventh Report
on State Responsibility, [1978] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 31. In this regard, the Commission
proposed the following article: "There is no breach by a State of an international obligation
requiring it to prevent a given event unless, following a lack of prevention on the part of the
State, the event in question occurs." Id. at 37.
132. Specifically, the Commission proposed the following article: "The fact that a State
renders assistance to another State by its conduct in order to enable or help that State to com-
mit an international offence against a third State, which thus becomes an accessory to the
commission of the offence and incurs international responsibility thereby, even if the conduct
in question would not otherwise be internationally wrongful." Id. at 60.
133. In this regard, the Commission proposed the following article: "An internationally
wrongful act committed by a State in a field of activity in which that State is not in possession
of complete freedom of decision, being subject, in law or in fact, to the directions or the con-
trol of another State, does not entail the international responsibility of the State committing
the wrongful act, but entails the indirect international responsibility of the State which is in a
position to give directions or exercise control." Roberto Ago, Eighth Report on State Respon-
sibility, [1979] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 3, 26-27, Doc. AICN.4/318. The International Law
Commission also noted that a state would also be responsible if it coerced another state to
commit an internationally wrongful act." Id. at 27.
134. State Responsibility, [1980] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 26, 30-34, U.N. Doc. A/52/10.
135. See id.
136. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY 4 (Cambridge University Press 2002).
137. id.
138. Report of the International Law Commission: Articles on the Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 59, 68,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
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An historical overview of the codification of the laws of state responsi-
bility reveal that international law recognizes that a state may be held liable
for failing to prevent international law violations by people within their own
state, or for failing to prevent the international law violations of states under
their control. As such, the United States could be held liable under the doc-
trine of state responsibility if it is determined that the United States had con-
trol over General Dostum's troops for the death by container, but failed to
prevent them from violating international law.
B. Concepts as Examined by International Courts and Tribunals
The doctrine of state responsibility for acts of omission has also been
well-documented under international case law. By analyzing the case law of
two international courts, namely, the International Court of Justice and the
European Court of Human Rights, one will see that several decisions have
been rendered holding states responsible under the doctrine of state respon-
sibility.
1. International Court of Justice
The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) was established in 1945 as the
judicial branch of the newly created United Nations, replacing the Permanent
Court of International Justice.' 39 One of the cases that has been heard by the
I.C.J., involving the issue of state responsibility is the Corfu Channel case.
In that case, the Court was asked to determine whether Albania was respon-
sible for the deaths and damages incurred by two British ships as they passed
through Albanian waters."4 Evidence revealed that the ships were damaged
by mines that were part of a recently laid minefield. 4' Although the Court
was able to determine what caused the damages to the ships, it did not have
enough evidence to determine which state actually laid the minefields.' 42
Nevertheless, the Court found it necessary to continue by examining whether
Albania was responsible for the deaths and damages incurred by the British
ships, even if the court could not positively determine which state laid the
minefields. 43
Regarding state responsibility for the damages, the Court found that be-
cause Albania had exclusive control over its territorial waters, the burden of
proof would fall on Albania to show that Albania did not know that the
mines were there. 1" The Court found that it was improbable that Albania did
139. MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, CASES AND COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW 260 (2d ed. 2001).
140. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 6 (Merits of April 9).
141. Id. at 15.
142. Id. at 17.
143. See id. at 4.
144. See id. at 18.
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not know about the mines, because the mines must have been laid at a time
when Albania was vigilantly watching the Corfu Channel, and that, based on
the geography of the channel, it would have been nearly impossible to lay
the mines without being noticed. 45 Based on this finding, the Court further
noted that Albania was obligated to notify the United Kingdom that the
Corfu Channel had been mined, or at least attempt to notify the British ships
of the existence of the mines."4 Because Albania failed to act, the Court
found that Albania was "responsible under international law for the explo-
sions which occurred on October 22nd, 1946, in Albanian waters, and for the
damage and loss of human life which resulted from them, and that there is a
duty upon Albania to pay compensation to the United Kingdom." 47
In another case, the I.C.J. analyzed whether the doctrine of state respon-
sibility would apply to a state that failed to protect another state from non-
state actors who were violating international law.' That case concerned a
group of armed protesters who overran the United States Embassy in Tehran
on November 4, 1979, and took the diplomatic and consular staff at the em-
bassy as hostages. 149 Although security personnel were near the embassy at
the time the protesters entered the building, the security personnel did noth-
ing to deter or prevent the protesters from taking over the building. 150 Fol-
lowing the takeover, repeated calls for help from the hostages and from dip-
lomats in Washington were ignored by the Iranian government. 51
The first issue examined by the Court with respect to the doctrine of
state responsibility was whether the initial takeover by the protesters could
be imputed to the Iranian government.5 2 Although the leader of Iran previ-
ously made statements that some may have interpreted to encourage such ac-
tion, the Court did not impute liability for the initial takeover to the Iranian
government. 53 The second question examined by the Court, however, was
whether the Iranian government could be held liable for failing to take any
measures to protect the diplomatic and consular staff from being taken hos-
tage at the embassy. 154 In this regard, the Court found that Iran had a special
145. Id. at 20.
146. Id. at 22.
147. Id. at 23.
148. Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
149. Id. at 12.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 12-13.
152. Id. at 29-30.
153. Id. at 29. The Ayatollah Khomeini had "declared that it was 'up to the dear pupils,
students and theological students to expand with all their might their attacks against the
United States and Israel, so they may force the United States to return the deposed and crimi-
nal shah, and to condemn this great plot[.]" Id. This statement, however, was not deemed by
the Court to constitute an authorization by the State to take over the United States Embassy.
Id.
154. Id. at 30-31.
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duty to protect the staff because the embassy personnel were foreign diplo-
mats. 55 Ultimately, the Court found that although Iran knew of its duties un-
der international law and was aware that pleas for help were made, Iran
failed to comply with its international obligations, despite possessing the
means to comply.15 6 As a result, the doctrine of state responsibility applied,
making Iran liable for failing to protect the consular staff. 57
The I.C.J. has also found that a country may be held liable under the
doctrine of state responsibility for failing to prevent one state from commit-
ting an internationally wrongful act against another state. The Court men-
tioned this possibility in dicta, in the Corfu Channel case discussed above.
Regarding the obligation to prevent one state from violating international
law and consequently harming another state, the Court noted that states have
"the obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts con-
trary to the rights of other States."'' 58 The Court did not spend too much time
on this issue, however, because the Court focused instead on the greater ob-
ligation of a state to inform another state about imminent dangers.'
59
2. European Court of Human Rights
As with the I.C.J., the European Court of Human Rights (E.C.H.R) has
also recognized the doctrine of state responsibility. The E.C.H.R. addressed
the doctrine of state responsibility regarding the potential actions of another
state. In Soering v. United Kingdom, a German national alleged that the
United Kingdom would violate his rights under the European Convention if
it extradited him to the United States on a murder charge.1 60 He argued,
among other things, that exposure to the "death row phenomenon"1 61 would
violate the European Convention's prohibition against inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment.1 62 Ultimately, the Court found that if the United Kingdom ex-
tradited Soering to the United States and if he faced the possibility of being
subject to the "death row phenomenon," such actions would violate the
European Convention's prohibition against degrading and inhuman treat-
ment.'63 Thus, the E.C.H.R. determined that England could be held liable
under the doctrine of state responsibility for the actions of another state. That
is, if England deported Soering to the United States, it would risk placing
155. Id.
156. Id. at 32-33.
157. See id.
158. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 22.
159. Id.
160. Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 439 (1989).
161. Id. at 463. "Death row phenomenon" refers to the conditions of life on death row,
including the long wait between sentencing and the time the sentence is carried out," id. at
474, "extreme stress, psychological deterioration, and risk of homosexual abuse and physical
attack." Id. at 460.
162. Id. at 463.
163. Id. at 478.
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him in a situation where another country might violate his rights under the
European Convention.
The E.C.H.R. addressed the same issue regarding a Sikh separatist from
India, who was accused of terrorism"6 and, thus, was considered a threat to
national security and ordered deported from England.165 The English gov-
ernment encouraged the Court to conduct a balancing test between its right
to protect national security and the applicant's right to not be subjected to
inhuman or degrading treatment upon deportation back to India.' 66 Ulti-
mately, the Court refused to conduct such a balancing test.167 The Court held
that, even in expulsion cases, the prohibition against inhuman and degrading
treatment is paramount above all other concerns and "the activities of the in-
dividual in question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material
consideration."'
68
The case law of the E.C.H.R. reveals that the Court recognizes the doc-
trine of state responsibility. 6 9 The cases discussed demonstrate that the
E.C.H.R. will find a state responsible for the acts of another state if a person
is subjected to the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment through deporta-
tion.
As noted, both the I.C.J. and the E.C.H.R. have assessed liability to a
state in cases where a state could have prevented the international law viola-
tions of another state, or when their own state violated international law. If
one of these courts were to obtain jurisdiction over the United States and ini-
tiate an action against the U.S. for the crimes committed by General Dos-
turn's troops at Dasht-e Leili, they would find the United States liable under
the doctrine of state responsibility if they found that the United States had
control over Dostum's actions, but failed to stop him.
V. U.S. LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF OMISSION DURING
THE AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT
International law recognizes that states or commanders may be held re-
sponsible for the actions of others. 17' This is evident by looking at the doc-
trines of command responsibility and state responsibility. The question re-
mains, however, as to whether the United States, or Captain Mark D.
164. Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413 (1996).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 456.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 457.
169. See also Plattform "Arzte fur das Leben" v. Austria, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
204 (1991).
170. See, e.g., Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on En-
forcement of Penalties: Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, 14 AM. J.
INT'L L. 95, 143 (1920); Protocol I, supra note 54; Rome Statute, supra note 56.
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Nutsch, the leader of the 595 A-team from the Fifth Special Forces Group,
could be held liable for acts of omission during the Afghanistan conflict.
What is known is that hundreds, perhaps thousands, of surrendered
Taliban soldiers were killed by suffocation in the foreign aid containers that
were used by General Dostum's Northern Alliance army to transport the sur-
rendered men.171 Though no evidence suggests that American soldiers were
present when the containers were finally opened, the 595 A-team from the
Fifth Special Forces Group was working with General Dostum as the link
between U.S. air forces and Northern Alliance ground forces at the time the
events occurred." 2 The 595 A-team was also present at the surrender nego-
tiations and at the actual surrender of the Taliban soldiers.173 In addition, the
595 A-Team was working to secure prison security at the time the containers
were delivered to the area.174 Though the 595 A-Team may have thought that
reports about the atrocities that occurred during the ten days that the con-
tainer transports were taking place were exaggerated, they surely heard re-
ports of the deaths. 7 5 Though Pentagon and Defense Department officials
have avoided questions about the incidents and have made claims that all re-
ports are false,176 the veracity of their responses is questionable. Even if it is
true that the United States knew absolutely nothing of the transports, the
question remains as to whether the U.S. should have known about the trans-
ports. Under the circumstances, it is necessary to consider whether the
United States or Captain Mark D. Nutsch can be held responsible for acts of
omission during the Afghanistan conflict.
A. Command Responsibility
As noted above, the doctrine of command responsibility attaches when a
commander knew, or should have known, that atrocities were occurring, yet
the commander did not take reasonable steps to prevent the abuses. 17 7 This
doctrine applies regardless of whether a person was acting in an official ca-
pacity, so long as the person had control over the people who committed the
internationally wrongful acts.'78 The standard of whether a commander knew
171. Dehghanpisheh et. al., supra note 2, at 25; Physicians for Human Rights, supra note
26.
172. Dehghanpisheh et al., supra note 2, at 29.
173. Id. at 30.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 24.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on En-
forcement of Penalties: Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, 14 AM. J.
INT'L L. 95, 143 (1920); Protocol I, supra note 54; Rome Statute, supra note 86, at art. 28.
178. Prosecutor v. Delalid and Others, Case No.: IT-96-21-T, reprinted in 3 ANNOTATED
LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1997-1999 (Andr6 Klip & Goran Sluiter, eds.,
2001).
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that atrocities were being committed by his or her subordinates is subject to a
standard of reasonableness.179 That is, although it may be reasonable to be-
lieve that one isolated event occurred that, when viewed in one context is le-
gal under international law and in another is illegal, it may not be reasonable
to believe that several similar events occurring within a short period of time
were all legal under international law. 80 Thus, an officer who knows that
events are occurring that could be either legal or illegal based on the context
of the events, has a duty to investigate the events to make sure that they were
all, in fact, legal under international law. In addition to being liable for fail-
ing to investigate suspicious events, a commander is deemed to have acqui-
esced to the actions of his or her troops if he or she fails to supervise those
under his or her command and control.18" '
Returning to the question of whether Captain Mark D. Nutsch could be
held responsible for failing to prevent the Northern Alliance from killing
Taliban soldiers in transport containers, one must analyze the events that oc-
curred in Afghanistan, while keeping the rules and standards of international
law in mind. Even if Captain Nutsch did not actually know that the surren-
dered soldiers were asphyxiated in transport containers, a reasonableness
standard would dictate that he should have known about the atrocities. This
standard was used by the Nuremberg tribunal in the Rauer case. 82 Rauer
was convicted for failing to investigate questionable reports given to him by
his subordinates. As noted earlier, the court held him responsible for the
murder of prisoners because he did not investigate his subordinates' reports,
even though he received several reports that prisoners had been shot while
trying to escape. 8 3 Similarly, Nutsch was in the area at the time the transport
containers arrived and was involved with providing security for the prison.
He must have heard some of the reports about the deaths. As such, after
hearing one or more reports about the deaths, he should have conducted an
investigation to substantiate or refute the reports made by incoming prison-
ers. Thus, he either knew, or should have known, that the atrocities were tak-
ing place and should have at least taken measures to investigate the reports
of the deaths. By not doing so, his inaction could be interpreted as acquies-
cence, just as Rauer' s actions, or inactions, were deemed to be acquiescence
by the Nuremberg tribunal.'84
In addition, Captain Nutsch cannot claim immunity based on the fact
that he is not a major or a general, because even civilians can be liable under
the doctrine of command responsibility if they have control over their subor-
179. Major Karl Rauer, supra note 83, at 117.
180. Such as in the Rauer case discussed earlier where it was reasonable to believe that
on group of prisoners were shot while trying to escape, but not several in a short period of
time. Id.
181. Wilhelm von Leeb, supra note 67, at 77.
182. Major Karl Rauer, supra note 83, at 116.
183. Id. at 113.
184. Id. at 117.
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dinates. The Celebici case shows that civilians, and those who do not have
formal authority over troops, can be held liable for the actions of their sub-
ordinates, so long as they have sufficient control over them. 85 Thus, the fact
that Nutsch is not a major or a general is irrelevant to liability under the doc-
trine of command responsibility. His position as captain is clearly one that
implies command and control. 86 The question remains, however, as to
whether Captain Nutsch had control over the Northern Alliance. If Captain
Nutsch could exert control or influence over the Northern Alliance troops,
then he clearly could be held liable for the deaths of the Taliban soldiers un-
der the doctrine of command responsibility. In that case, he could be held li-
able for his failure to act, because he either knew or should have known that
the atrocities were occurring and had control over the people committing the
internationally wrongful acts.
One further question is, even if Captain Nutsch could not control the
troops of the Northern Alliance, could he have prevented the deaths by or-
dering his troops to take action to prevent them? Thus far, the courts have
not addressed this issue under the doctrine of command responsibility. There
is no evidence to suggest that commanders have a positive duty to prevent
other troops that are not under their control from violating international law.
While Captain Nutsch could be held liable under the doctrine of command
responsibility if he had control over the Northern Alliance troops, he proba-
bly could not be held liable for his acts of omission in the absence of such
control.
B. State Responsibility
The other doctrine which must be examined regarding U.S. liability for
acts of omission during the Afghanistan conflict is the doctrine of state re-
sponsibility. As noted above, the doctrine of state responsibility attaches as a
result of the commission of internationally wrongful acts, or omissions
amounting to internationally wrongful acts.'87 It also applies when a state
fails to prevent individuals, states, or organizations under that state's author-
ity from committing internationally wrongful acts.188 Indeed, states are
sometimes required to take positive steps to prevent violations from occur-
ring."'89 In addition, states may be held responsible under the doctrine of state
responsibility for subjecting a person to the danger that another state may
185. Prosecutor v. Delalic, ICTY Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (1998),
reprinted in 3 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1997-1999, 363 (Andrd
Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2001).
186. See id.
187. Report of the International Law Commission: Articles on the Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 59, 68,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
188. State Responsibility, [1980] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 26, 31, U.N. Doc. A/52/10.
189. Plattform 'Arzte fur das Leben' v. Austria, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 210 (1991).
2003)
23
Lane: The Mass Graves at Dasht-e Leili: Assessing U.S. Liability for Hu
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2003
168 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34
commit a violation of international law against them.1 "° States may also be
held liable for the illegal actions of civilians'91 or for failing to warn another
state of imminent dangers.192
Here, there is no question that killing soldiers by asphyxiation in trans-
port containers is a violation of international law. 193 Thus, the Northern Alli-
ance violated international law by killing the surrendered Taliban soldiers in
this manner. Regarding liability for acts of omission, however, one must
conduct a more detailed analysis. Since states may be held liable for failing
to prevent another state from committing an internationally wrongful act, it
may be argued that the United States could be held liable for failing to pre-
vent the deaths of the Taliban soldiers in Afghanistan in November 2001. It
might further be asserted that the United States had a positive duty to ensure
that the surrendered soldiers were protected from harm. That is, as with the
extradition cases in the European Court of Human Rights discussed above,
in which the United Kingdom was threatened with violating international
law if it extradited people who faced a serious threat of torture or inhuman
and degrading treatment, 194 the United States could be held liable for allow-
ing the surrendered Taliban soldiers to be transported by General Dostum
and his troops when there was a likelihood they would be mistreated.' 95 In
addition, General Dostum was notorious for being "one of Afghanistan's
most ruthless and effective warlords,"' 96 yet the United States allowed the
190. See Soering v. United Kingdom, II Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 440 (1989); Chahal v.
United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413, 414 (1996).
191. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Iran, 1980 I.C.J. 3,
32-33 (May 24, 1980).
192. The Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. Merits 4, 21-22 (April 9, 1949).
193. For example, Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that
"[e]veryone has the right to life," and Article 5 provides that "[nlo one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), at http://www. amanjor-
dan.org/english/un&re/un3.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004); Article 6 of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights also provides that everyone has the right to life and that this
right should not be taken away arbitrarily. In addition, Article 7 prohibits torture or cruel, in-
human, or degrading treatment. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), at http://www.amanjordan.
org/english/un&re/un5.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004); Article 2 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights protects the right to life and Article 3 prohibits torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by Proto-
cols Nos 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered into force on 21 September 1970, 20 December 1971,
1 January 1990, and 1 November 1998 respectively), at http://www.robin.no/-dadwatch/echr/
echr.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
194. See Soering v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 439 (1989); Chahal v.
United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413 (1996).
195. Once again, it must be noted that the United Kingdom would have been held liable
under its duties arising from the European Convention on Human Rights, an instrument that
the United States is not bound to follow.
196. Dehghanpisheh et al., supra note 2, at 25.
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surrendered Taliban soldiers to be surrendered to troops under his com-
mand.'9 7 It might be argued that the United States could be held liable for
exposing the soldiers to a serious threat of torture or inhuman and degrading
treatment. The facts of the container death situation shows the potential risk
of allowing soldiers to be surrendered to Dostum's troops was not abstract.
The risk was real, as demonstrated by the fact that General Dostum had a
reputation of being a ruthless warlord and that he lived up to his reputation
in November in Afghanistan by allowing hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
surrendered soldiers to die by asphyxiation in transport containers.
Finally, it may be argued that the United States could be held liable for
failing to warn the Taliban soldiers of the potential danger of surrendering to
General Dostum. The duty to forewarn was defined in the Corfu Channel
case, discussed above, where Albania knew, or should have known, that its
channel was mined.'98 However, it is not likely that a court will find the
United States liable under this theory because the events that occurred in Af-
ghanistan can be distinguished from the facts of the Corfu Channel case. In
the Corfu Channel case, the Court addressed the duty to warn another State,
not individuals. In addition, it is highly unlikely that the surrendering Tali-
ban soldiers were unaware of the dangers they were facing, unlike the British
ships in the Corfu Channel case. It could also be argued that the United
States did not know of the danger posed to the surrendered soldiers until it
was already too late. Thus, it is not likely that the United States could be
held liable for failing to warn the surrendering soldiers of the imminent harm
that they faced. This does not mean, however, that the United States could
not be held liable under the doctrine of state responsibility based on other ar-
guments discussed above.
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment has focused on possible U.S. state and command liability
under international law for acts of omission that occurred during the Af-
ghanistan conflict. Based on the doctrine of command responsibility, Cap-
tain Mark D. Nutsch would be held liable for the deaths by container of the
Taliban soldiers. Captain Nutsch knew, or should have known, what was
happening, but did nothing to stop the Northern Alliance from killing the
surrendered soldiers. Nutsch may argue that he did not have effective control
over the actions of General Dostum' s troops. Perhaps this fact would release
him from liability, but a court would first have to determine if Nutsch, in
fact, had no control over the troops, and whether this meant that he had no
power to stop the violations from occurring.
If it is determined that the United States had control over Dostum's
troops, the United States could also be held liable for the "deaths by con-
197. Id.
198. The Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. Merits 4, 21-22 (Apr. 9, 1949).
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tainer" of the Taliban soldiers. Facts do suggest that the United States had
some form of control over the area. That is, they were occupying the area as
a military presence and they were in charge of the prison that the prisoners
were being transported to. They were also working in concert with Dostum's
troops. As such, it is likely that a court would find that the United States had
sufficient control over the area to hold them responsible for the deaths by
container.
Even assuming, that Captain Nutsch or the United States could be held
liable under the doctrines of command or state responsibility for their acts of
omission during the war in Afghanistan, it is important to note that it is
highly unlikely that either Captain Nutsch or the United States will be prose-
cuted. One obstacle that a potential prosecutor would face is finding the ap-
propriate forum in which to prosecute the acts of omission. Even assuming
that the case were prosecuted in an international court, tribunal, or other fo-
rum, and further assuming that Captain Nutsch or the United States were
found liable under the doctrines of command responsibility or state respon-
sibility analyzed above, it might be impossible to enforce a judgment against
Captain Nutsch or the United States.
Thus, the doctrines of command and state responsibility seem to dictate
that Captain Nutsch or the United States could be held liable for their acts of
omission during the Afghanistan conflict. Regarding Captain Nutsch, while
he probably could be held liable under the doctrine of command responsibil-
ity, he may negate this conclusion by demonstrating that he did not have ef-
fective control over the Northern Alliance troops. As stated above, the
United States could also be held liable under the doctrine of command re-
sponsibility. Regardless, the difficulty (or impossibility in) finding an appro-
priate forum to adjudicate and enforce such a decision make it extremely
unlikely that either Captain Nutsch or the United States will ever be success-
fully prosecuted for their actions or inactions during the Afghanistan con-
flict.
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